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ARTICLES
A CRITICAL ANALYSIS OF THE STANDARD OF
REVIEW APPLIED BY THE COURT OF
APPEALS FOR THE FEDERAL CIRCUIT IN
ANTIDUMPING AND COUNTERVAILING DUTY
CASES
HON. GREGORY W. CARMAN*
INTRODUCTION
In May 2001, the Federal Circuit Bar Association held its
annual meeting highlighting significant issues affecting cases
that fall within the jurisdiction of the United States Court of
Appeals for the Federal Circuit ("Federal Circuit"). I, along with
several distinguished members of the bench and bar,' had the
' Chief Judge of the United States Court of International Trade. The author would like to
acknowledge the assistance of his law clerks, Christopher M. Ryan and Stephen C.
Greene, Jr. in the preparation of this article.
I The panel was moderated by M. Page Hall of Dorsey & Whitney and included:
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opportunity to serve on a panel discussing the Federal Circuit's
standard of review in trade cases as compared to that in patent
cases. In particular, I was asked to address the basic standard of
review applied to cases appealed from the United States Court of
International Trade ("CIT").2
A discussion regarding the standard of review applied by the
Federal Circuit is of great significance to international trade
litigants because the Federal Circuit has adopted a standard of
review for antidumping and countervailing duty cases that, in
the view of this writer, appears to lack substantive legal
justification, promotes judicial inefficiency, and duplicates the
standard of review utilized by the CIT. This so-called "apply
anew" standard applied in countervailing and anti-dumping
cases was announced approximately eighteen years ago by the
Federal Circuit in Atlantic Sugar Ltd., v. United States3
(hereinafter, Atlantic Sugar) when the court inexplicably stated
"we review [the CIT's] review of United States International
Trade Commission ("ITC") determination by applying anew the
statute's express judicial review standard."4 As support for its
announcement, the Court stated:
The statute [19 U.S.C. § 1516a] specifies that the standard of
judicial review of a final ITC material injury determination
in an antidumping case is whether that determination is
"unsupported by substantial evidence on the record, or
otherwise not in accordance with law." We therefore apply
the substantial evidence standard in reviewing the ITC's
factual determination that an industry in the United States
was materially injured by reason of Canadian sugar sold in
the United States at less than its fair value.5
Until 1994 the Federal Circuit consistently recited and applied
its Atlantic Sugar holding without question.6 In 1994, however,
Circuit Judge Arthur J. Gajarsa, United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit;
Chairman Stephen Koplan, International Trade Commission; Philippe M. Bruno, Dorsey
& Whitney; Cecilia H. Gonzalez, Howrey Simon Arnold & White; and Larry L. Shatzer,
Foley & Lardner.
2 The United States Court of International Trade is a trial level court possessing all
the powers in law and equity of a United States district court.
3 744 F.2d 1556 (Fed. Cir. 1984).
4 Id at 1559 n.10 (emphasis added).
5 Id. at 1559.
6 See, e.g., Koyo Seiko Co. v. United States, 20 F.3d 1160, 1164 (Fed. Cir. 1994)
(announcing that "this appellate court reviews the trial court's decision by applying anew
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the Federal Circuit decided Suramerica de Aleaciones
Laminadas, C.A. v. United States,7 which called into question the
propriety of the "apply anew" standard. 8 Since that time, both
the Federal Circuit and academic literature have begun to
question either directly or by implication the merits of
duplicating the review conducted by the Court of International
Trade.9 This article is intended to further explore whether the
"apply anew" standard is legally and practically appropriate for
the Federal Circuit's review of antidumping and countervailing
duty cases. To this end, this article will illustrate the legal and
practical difficulties surrounding the "apply anew" standard and
offer what is hoped are constructive suggestions that would bring
the Federal Circuit's review of trade cases more in line with the
manner in which other appellate courts judge district court
reviews of agency determinations. It will provide an overview of
the "apply anew" standard, its supposed legal basis, and an
account of how the Federal Circuit has applied this standard in
past cases. Additionally, this article will explore the practical
impact this standard appears to have had on the Federal
Circuit's disposition of trade cases. Finally, this article will
argue that the standard of review for cases involving agency
determinations articulated by the United States Supreme Court
in Universal Camera Corp. v. NLRBIO is an appropriate standard
to apply to trade cases before the federal circuit.
the statute's express judicial review standard"); PPG Indus., Inc. v. United States, 978
F.2d 1232, 1236 (Fed. Cir. 1992) (stating that "court must apply anew the statute's
express standard of review"); U.H.F.C. Co. v. United States, 916 F.2d 689, 696 (Fed. Cir.
1990) (applying Atlantic Sugar, 744 F.2d at 1559 n.10, and quoting "[wie review that
court's review of an [agency] determination by applying anew the statute's express
judicial review standard"); Olympic Adhesives, Inc. v. United States, 899 F.2d 1565, 1571
(Fed. Cir. 1990) (noting that "with regard to appeals," standard of review is a new
application of "the statute's express judicial review standard").
7 44 F.3d 978 (Fed. Cir. 1994).
8 Id. at 983 n.1 (announcing that "section 1516a is silent on what standard th[e] court
should apply when reviewing a Court of International Trade decision").
9 See Zenith Elecs. Corp. v. United States, 99 F.3d 1576, 1579 (Fed. Cir. 1996)
(Plager, J., concurring) (questioning "whether Atlantic Sugar articulates the proper
standard of review"); Id. at 1582 (Rader, J., concurring) (criticizing Atlantic Sugar
standard of review). See generally, Herbert C. Shelley, et al., The Standard of Review
Applied by the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit in International
Trade and Customs Cases, 45 AM. U. L. REV. 1749 (1996) (examining current standards of
review and suggesting more appropriate one).
10 340 U.S. 474, 491 (1951) (stating that court may "appl[y] a standard of review
which satisfies the present Congressional requirement").
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DISCUSSION
STANDARD OF REVIEW APPLIED BY THE FEDERAL CIRCUIT
Historically, appellate review of the international trade laws of
the United States has been a morass of ill-defined statutory
guidelines and inconsistent judicial practice. Early trade laws
drew little to no distinction between judicial review of customs
classification or valuation cases and the exceedingly more
complex antidumping and countervailing duty cases.I In fact,
these laws either did not address the standards of review to be
applied to antidumping and countervailing duty cases or
provided standards that were wholly inadequate.' 2  In the
absence of specific statutory guidance, the Court of Customs and
Patent Appeals ("CCPA") largely duplicated the work of the
United States Customs Court 3 by examining directly the
administrative record of each case to determine whether the
agency's decision was supported by substantial evidence.14 Case
law reveals, however, that the CCPA's duplicative efforts were
frequently guided by the reasoning of the Customs Court.15
Thus, although the CCPA professed to review the Customs
Court's standards de novo, as a practical matter it accorded
significant deference to the prior review by the Customs Court. 16
In 1979, Congress passed the Trade Agreements Act17 which
1 See Zen'th, 99 F.3d at 1580 (Fed. Cir. 1996) (Rader, J., concurring) (highlighting
"the historical context of judicial review in trade cases").
12 See S. REP. No. 96-249, at 245 (1979), reprintedin 1979 U.S.C.C.A.N. 381, 630-31
(recognizing deficiencies of earlier laws and providing a new scope of judicial review).
13 The United States Customs Court was the predecessor to the United States Court
of International Trade. Congress renamed this court through passage of the Federal
Courts Improvement Act of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-164, § 141, 96 Stat. 45 (1982).
14 See, e.g., City Lumber Co. v. United States, 457 F.2d 991, 994 (C.C.P.A. 1972)
(reviewing the ITC's findings after the Customs Court had already reviewed them);
Kleberg & Co. v. United States, 71 F.2d 332, 334 (C.C.P.A. 1933) (reviewing the Customs
Court's findings).
15 See, e.g., United States v. RMS Elecs., Inc., 624 F.2d 1081, 1082 (C.C.P.A. 1980)(approving of the Customs Court's interpretation of statute); Zwicker Knitting Mills v.
United States, 613 F.2d 295, 296-98 (C.C.P.A. 1980) (agreeing with the Customs Court's
reasoning); City Lumber Co., 457 F.2d at 994 (deferring to the Customs Court's
reasoning).
16 Zenith, 99 F.3d at 1581-82 (Rader, J., concurring) (stating that in several cases,
this court articulated standards of review that suggest deference to Court of International
Trade's prior review).
17 Trade Agreements Act of 1979, Pub. L. No. 96-39, 93 Stat. 144 [hereinafter the
"1979 Act") (codified as amended in scattered sections of Title 19 of the United States
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"dramatically altered the scope of judicial review for antidumping
and countervailing duty actions," 8 although its impact on the
appellate standard of review for these actions was negligible. For
example, the 1979 Act increased the standing of litigants to
challenge administrative determinations,19  increased the
equitable powers of the Court of International Trade, 20 and
greatly reduced the frequent interlocutory appeals submitted to
the CCPA (and ultimately to the Federal Circuit) by requiring
exhaustion of administrative remedies. 21 In addition, the 1979
Act restricted the CIT's review of antidumping and
countervailing duty cases to the agency record.22 This provision
was significant, not only because it restricted the scope of judicial
review permitted in antidumping and countervailing duty cases,
but also because it established the standard by which those cases
must be reviewed. Section 1516a(b)(1)(B)(i) of Title 19 states
that "[t]he court shall hold unlawful any determination, finding,
or conclusion found.. .to be unsupported by substantial evidence
on the record, or otherwise not in accordance with law."23
This standard is distinguishable from that applied by the CIT
in Customs cases. In Customs cases, the judges of the CIT may
conduct trials and take testimony, unlike the antidumping and
Code).
18 Zenith, 99 F.3d at 1581 (Rader, J., concurring).
19 See S. REP. NO. 96-249, at 249-50 (1979), reprinted in 1979 U.S.C.C.A.N. 381, 635-
36 (stating that new section 516A would greatly expand categories of persons who would
be entitled to institute suit in Customs Court in this type of case, as well as greatly
expand right of interested parties to appear and be heard in litigation concerning
antidumping and countervailing duties); see also 19 U.S.C. § 1677(9) (defining "interested
parties" entitled to bring suit).
20 See 28 U.S.C. § 1585 (providing "[tihe Court of International Trade shall possess all
the powers in law and equity of, or as conferred by statute upon, a district court of the
United States"); Zemth, 99 F.3d at 1581 (Rader, J., concurring) (stating that Congress
renamed the Customs Court to the Court of International Trade to more accurately
describe its expanded role).
21 See 28 U.S.C. § 2637(d) (2000) (stating that in any civil action not specified in this
section, the Court of International Trade shall, where appropriate, require exhaustion of
administrative remedies).
22 19 U.S.C. § 1516a(b)(1)(B)(i) & (2) states:
"[Tihe record, unless otherwise stipulated by the parties, shall consist of (i) a copy of
all information presented to or obtained by the Secretary, the administering
authority, or the Commission during the course of the administrative proceeding,
including all governmental memoranda pertaining to the case and the record of ex
parte meetings required to be kept by section 1677f(a)(3) of this title (ii) and a copy
of the determination, all transcripts or records of conferences or hearings, and all
notices published in the Federal Register."
See 19 U.S.C. § 1516a(b)(1)(B)(i) & (2).
23 19 U.S.C. § 1516a(b)(1)(B)(i) (2002).
2003]
182 ST JOHN'S JOURNAL OF LEGAL COMMENTARY
countervailing duty cases, where the court must review the
record compiled by the responsible agency. 24  The statute
provides that Customs Court decisions are presumed to be
correct, and the importer has the burden of proving otherwise.25
While the statute provides that Customs decisions are accorded a
presumption of correctness, the presumption "is a procedural
device that is designed to allocate, between the two litigants to a
lawsuit, the burden of producing evidence in sufficient
quantity."26 While the presumption of correctness "certainly
carries force on any factual components of a [Customs Court]
decision," it "carries no force as to questions of law," which the
CIT reviews de novo. 27 The Federal Circuit, in turn, reviews the
CIT's conclusions of law de novo. 28 Following a trial, the Federal
Circuit reviews the CIT's findings of fact for clear error.29 The
clearly erroneous standard requires the Federal Circuit to accept
the CIT's findings of fact unless the Federal Circuit is left with a
"definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been
committed."30
With respect to the appellate standard of review for
antidumping and countervailing duty cases, the 1979 Act only
provided one standard of review expressly applicable to the
Federal Circuit. Under this standard, findings of fact made by
the CIT could not be set aside unless "clearly erroneous."31 This
standard also codified the measure of deference to be accorded
CIT decisions by stating that "due regard shall be given to the
24 19 U.S.C. § 1516a(b)(2)(A)(i) (2002) (stating that the record to be reviewed must
consist of all materials presented by administering authority).
25 See 28 U.S.C. § 2639(a)(1) (2000) (providing "in any civil action commenced in the
Court of International Trade under § 515, 516, or 516A of the Tariff Act of 1930 [19
U.S.C.S. § 1515, 1516, or 1516a], the decision of the Secretary of the Treasury, the
administering authority, or the International Trade Commission is presumed to be
correct. The burden of proving otherwise shall rest upon the party challenging such
decision.").
26 Universal Elecs., Inc. v. United States, 112 F.3d 488, 492 (Fed. Cir. 1997).
27 Id; see also 28 U.S.C. § 2640(a)(1) (2000) (stating that the CIT shall make its
determinations upon the basis of the record made before the court in civil actions
contesting denial of protest under section 515 of Tariff Act of 1930).
28 See Bestfoods v. United States, 260 F.3d 1320, 1323 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (illustrating
an example of Federal Circuit review of CIT judgment de novo on appeal).
29 See Better Home Plastics Corp. v. United States, 119 F.3d 969, 971 (Fed. Cir. 1997)
(stating that, on appeal, the Federal Circuit reviews findings of the CIT and not those of
Customs Court for clear error, while deciding questions of law de nova).
30 United States v. United States Gypsum Co., 333 U.S. 364, 395 (1948).
31 See 28 U.S.C. § 2601(c) (1980) (repealed Pub. L. No. 97-164 § 140, 96 Stat. 44
(1982)).
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Court of International Trade to judge the credibility of
witnesses."32 This standard was ultimately repealed, however,
because review of antidumping and countervailing duty cases
was restricted to the agency record, thereby eliminating the
court's role as fact-finder.33 Thus, the only statutorily mandated
standard of review applicable to antidumping and countervailing
duty cases was that to be applied by the CIT: "The court shall
hold unlawful any determination, finding, or conclusion found...
to be unsupported by substantial evidence on the record, or
otherwise not in accordance with law." 34
The absence of explicit statutory guidance caused the CCPA,
and, after 1982, the Federal Circuit,35 to continue to apply the
combination de novo/deference standard that had historically
governed its review of antidumping and countervailing duty
cases. In 1984, however, the Federal Circuit decided Atlantic
Sugar2 6 and articulated the "apply anew" standard, which
continues to govern review of antidumping and countervailing
duty cases. In that case the Federal Circuit stated that "[w]e
review the [CIT's] review of an ITC determination by applying
anew the statute's express judicial review standard."37 The court
further noted that "[t]he statute specifies that the standard of
judicial review.., in an antidumping case is whether that
determination is 'unsupported by substantial evidence on the
record, or otherwise not in accordance with law."'38 The court
failed to explain, however, the basis upon which it made its
decision to "apply anew" the standard of review expressly
granted to the Court of International Trade by statute. On the
contrary, the Federal Circuit relegated its discussion of this
standard of review to a footnote. 39
Criticism of the "apply anew" standard revolves around the
CAFC's seemingly improvident use of scarce judicial resources at
32 Id.
33 Atlantic Sugar, Ltd. v. United States, 744 F.2d 1556, 1559 (Fed Cir. 1984)
(substituting substantial evidence standard).
34 19 U.S.C. § 1516 a(b)(1)(B)i) (1994).
35 The United States Court of Customs and Patent Appeals was renamed as the
United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit with the passage of the Federal
Courts Improvement Act of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-164, § 141, 96 Stat. 45 (1982).
36 744 F.2d 1556 (Fed. Cir. 1984).
37 Id. at 1559 n.10 (emphasis added).
38 Id. at 1559.
39 Seeid. at 1599 n.10.
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the appellate level, causing undue delay in the resolution of
disputes and resulting in potential unnecessary costs to the
parties as well as a drag on national and international
commercial intercourse.
PROBLEMS WITH THE FEDERAL CIRCUIT'S STANDARD OF REVIEW
The 'Apply Anew" Standard Is Not Legally Required
There are several problems with the Federal Circuit's standard
of review in trade cases. First, the "apply anew" standard does
not seem to be legally required. In Atlantic Sugar, the Federal
Circuit stated that it would "apply[] anew the [antidumping]
statute's express judicial review standard."40  The express
judicial review standard the Federal Circuit was referring to is
found in 19 U.S.C. § 1516a(b) (1994). Under this standard, the
Court of International Trade "shall hold unlawful any
determination, finding, or conclusion found... to be unsupported
by substantial evidence on the record, or otherwise not in
accordance with law ... ."41 Interestingly, the only court
referenced in the statute is the Court of International Trade.
Thus, there is no question that the Court of International Trade
must apply the "substantial evidence and otherwise in
accordance with law" standard. There is nothing in the statute
obligating the Federal Circuit to apply this standard. Indeed, no
statute requires the Federal Circuit to apply this standard, nor
does the legislative history support this interpretation.42 Under
the doctrine of statutory interpretation known as expressio unius
est exclusio alterius, it may be inferred that Congress intended to
exclude the Federal Circuit from the operation of 19 U.S.C. §
1516a since only the Court of International Trade is specifically
mentioned in the statute. 43
The Federal Circuit has itself noted this discrepancy on several
occasions. In Suramerica, the court explained that
40 Id. at 1559 n.10.
41 19 U.S.C. § 1516a (b)(1)(B)(i) (1994).
42 See 19 U.S.C. § 1516a (failing to mention that federal circuit is obligated to apply
this standard of review).
43 See BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 692 (4th ed. 1951) (defining the phrase as tendency
to exclude omissions because inference of intention).
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[r]ead as a whole... section 1516a does not support this
proposition. Section 1516a(b)(1)-(B) provides that 'the court'
must apply the statutory standard in actions brought under
19 U.S.C. § 1516a(a)(2) (1988). Section 1516a(a)(2)
addresses the Court of International Trade's review of
certain ITC determinations. Thus 'the court' of section
1516a(b)(1)-(B) is the Court of International Trade. Section
1516a is silent on what standard [the Federal Circuit] should
apply when reviewing a Court of International Trade
decision. 44
Finally, in Zenith Elecs. Corp. v. United States,45 Judge Rader4 6
noted in a concurring opinion that
the statute invoked by Atlantic Sugar as the sole explanation
for [the Federal Circuit's] standard of review in fact refers
only to the standard of review for the Court of International
Trade. Section 1516a(b) does not refer to any other court.
Section 1516a therefore does not supply a standard of review
for this court on appeal.47
It is respectfully submitted that the Federal Circuit's adoption
of the standard of review in 19 U.S.C. § 1516a as its own was a
mistake.
The 'Apply Anew" Standard Is Duplicative and Time Consuming
Another major problem with the "apply anew" standard of
review is that it duplicates the review conducted by the Court of
International Trade in the first instance. As a result, the
resolution of trade cases is extremely time consuming. These
unfortunate by-products of the Federal Circuit's review process
are expressly contrary to Congressional intent. The standard of
review set forth in 19 U.S.C. § 1516a and applicable to the Court
of International Trade was enacted by Congress to "streamline
and expedite the review of antidumping and countervailing duty
proceedings by providing for expedited Judicial Review of all
44 See Suramerica De Aleaciones Laminadas, C.A. v. United States, 44 F.3d 978, 983
n.1 (Fed. Cir. 1994).
45 99 F.3d 1576 (Fed. Cir. 1996).
46 It should be noted that Judge Rader was also the author of the court's opinion in
Suramerica.
47 Zenith, 99 F.3d 1576, 1580 (Rader, J., concurring).
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reviewable determinations."48 Congress further noted that the
statute "amends present law to eliminate de novo review of
determinations or assessments made pursuant to the
antidumping and countervailing duty laws [and that t]he present
standard of de novo review is both time consuming and
duplicative."49  Congress also found that the "advantage of
requiring an evidentiary record and review on that record would
be the reduction in redundant proceedings." 50
The Federal Circuit's application of the "apply anew" standard
is contrary to this goal. From 1984, when the Federal Circuit
announced its "apply anew" standard of review, through 2000, it
has heard an average of fifty-two appeals per year from the Court
of International Trade.51 That number rose to one hundred and
sixty in 2001, an increase of more than 150 percent. 52 The
increase in the number of trade cases filed with the Federal
Circuit will certainly have an adverse impact on the time
necessary to dispose of them. From 1996 through 2000, the
average length of time between date of docketing and date of
disposition for cases appealed from the CIT was approximately
fourteen months. 53 That time will surely increase as the Federal
Circuit reviews the record of every case on appeal from the CIT.
The Federal Circuit itself has been critical of this natural
outcome of the redundant standard of review, noting that
"replication of the record review already performed effectively
renders the Court of International Trade's review superfluous
[because in] addition to adding unnecessary time and expense to
the appeal process, . . . [it] undercuts the benefits this court
derives from the experience and expertise of the Court of
International Trade."54
48 H.R. REP. No. 96-317, at 181 (1979).
49 H.R. REP. No. 96-317 (emphasis added).
50 H.R. REP. No. 96-317.
51 See Memorandum from Edward W. Hosken, Jr., Chief Deputy Clerk for
Administration for the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, to Leo Gordon, Clerk
of Court for the U.S. Court of International Trade (Mar. 27, 2002) (on file with author).
52 Id.
53 Id.
54 Zenith Elecs. Corp. v. United States, 99 F.3d 1576, 1583 (Fed. Cir. 1996) (Rader, J.,
concurring) (questioning the propriety of the Atlantic Sugar standard).
[Vol. 17:177
A CRITICAL ANALYSIS OF THE STANDARD OF REVIEW
The 'Apply Anew" Standard Is No Longer Consistently Applied
Despite claims that the "apply anew" standard governs Federal
Circuit reviews of CIT decisions, the Federal Circuit has been
inconsistent in its application of that standard. While the
Atlantic Sugar standard was applied consistently for almost ten
years following its issuance, in the 1994 case Suramerica, the
Federal Circuit began to question the wisdom of "applying anew"
the CIT's standard of review. 55 The issue in that case was the
propriety of an ITC "threat of material injury" determination. 56
The Suramerica panel recited the "apply anew" standard but
then went on to suggest that the Atlantic Sugar standard of
review was faulty.5 7 The three-judge panel ultimately decided
that "[a]lthough reviewing anew the [agency] determination, this
court will not ignore the informed opinion of the Court of
International Trade. That court reviewed the record in
considerable detail. Its opinion deserves due respet."S
Supporting this outcome, the Court first noted that the
Atlantic Sugar decision did not cite any legal authority when
announcing the "apply anew" standard. 59 Second, the Court
stated "Atlantic Sugar appears to rely on a belief that [section
1516a] prescribes [the CAFC's] standard of review."60 The Court
noted, however, "section 1516a does not support this
proposition."6' Instead "the court" to which the statute referred
was the Court of International Trade; the statute was silent on
what standard the Federal Circuit should apply to review a
decision of the Court of International Trade.62 Third, the panel
suggested the standard of review that should be applied is the
one outlined by the Supreme Court in Universal Camera Corp. v.
NLRB:
Whether on the record as a whole there is substantial
55 See Suramerica De Aleaciones Laminadas, C.A. v. United States, 44 F.3d 978, 982
n. 1 (Fed. Cir. 1994) (discussing standard originated in Atlantic Sugar).
56 Id. at 980 (fMinding that Venezuelan imports of aluminum EC rod pose threat of
material injury to the domestic industry).
57 Id. at 983 n. 1 (commenting that section 1516a does not support proposition).
58 Id. at 983 (suggesting deference despite statutory silence) (emphasis added).
59 Id. at 983 n. 1 (discussing lack of support).
60 Id. at 983.
61 Id. at 983 n.1 (commenting on section 1516a).
62 Id. (determining "the court" that section 1516a(b)(1)-(B) referred to is the Court of
International Trade).
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evidence to support agency findings is a question which
Congress has placed in the keeping of the [court reviewing
the agency determination]. This Court will intervene only in
what ought to be the rare instance when the [substantial
evidence] standard appears to have been misapprehended or
grossly misapplied.63
Finally, the panel stated that "[i]f in a future appeal this court
were offered the opportunity to reconsider the Atlantic Sugar
rule en banc, this court might better consider only whether the
Court of International Trade misapprehended or grossly
misapplied the statutory standard."64
Perhaps the strongest criticism of the Atlantic Sugar standard
of review came in the form of two concurrences in Zenith Elecs.
Corp. v. United States.65  The issue in Zenith was whether
Commerce properly calculated the cost of production of the
subject merchandise. 66 In that case the three-judge panel applied
the Atlantic Sugar standard of review in affirming the CIT.67
However, Judges Plager and Rader wrote concurring opinions
solely addressing the standard of review. Judge Plager wrote:
The review called for by Atlantic Sugar finds support in
neither the statutes nor in common sense .... For us to
purport to review again the agency record of decision to
determine if substantial evidence exists has at least three
pernicious consequences. First, it encourages disappointed
litigants with deep pockets to seek a second bite at the apple,
often with no visible benefits except to the litigators since
generally we are not likely to reverse on that ground.
Second, such appeals waste scarce judicial resources and
deflect our attention from substantive issues which might be
determinative. And third, the judges of the CIT cannot help
but feel their efforts at review of the record, often extensive
and thorough, are unappreciated. 68
Judge Rader noted in his concurring opinion that ever since
the Atlantic Sugar standard was announced, the Federal Circuit
63 Id. at 983 (quoting Universal Camera Corp. v. NLRB, 340 U.S. 474, 491 (1951)).
64 Id.
65 99 F.3d 1576, 1579 (Fed. Cir. 1996) (applying antidumping duties to Tawain color
television receivers).
66 Id. at 1578-9 (finding substantial evidence supports the agency determination).
67 Id. at 1579 (Plager, J., concurring) (describing drawbacks to the Atlantic Sugar
standard).
68 Id. at 1582.
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has questioned the propriety of that standard and its duplication
of the review performed by the Court of International Trade.69
Judge Rader focused on a series of cases in which the Federal
Circuit articulated standards of review suggesting deference
should be given to the CIT's prior review.70 However, after
articulating such a standard, the respective panels continued to
apply the substantial evidence standard to the agency
determination at issue. For example, in Matsushita Elec. Indus.
Co. v. United States, the Federal Circuit stated its review would
"determine whether the [CIT] correctly applied the statutory
standard of 19 U.S.C. § 1516a(b)(1)(B)."7' However, the court
simultaneously examined whether there was substantial
evidence in the administrative record to support the
Commission's conclusion.7 2 Additionally, in Smith Corona Corp.
v. United States, the Federal Circuit stated its intention to
determine whether the Court of International Trade committed
reversible error.73 However, it then proceeded to determine
whether the agency determination was supported by substantial
evidence on the record. 74 Judges Plager's and Rader's concurring
opinions clearly demonstrate support for the sentiments raised
by the Federal Circuit in Suramerica.
The Federal Circuit has also recognized that not only is the
CIT's opinion due some measure of respect based on its thorough
review of the record, it is also due respect based on its expertise
in trade matters. Notably, in Camargo Correa Metais, S.A. v.
United States the Federal Circuit stated:
Because the Court of International Trade enjoys exclusive
jurisdiction to review the decisions of the ITA [International
Trade Administration], its decisions on the occasions of such
review are of significant import. Given the exclusive
69 Id. (questioning the wisdom of the Atlantic Sugar standard and review of Court of
International Trade).
70 See id. (citing Belton Indus. Inc. v. United States, 6 F.3d 756 (Fed. Cir. 1993);
American Permac, Inc. v. United States, 831 F.2d 269 (Fed. Cir. 1987); Matsushita Elec.
Indus. Co. v. United States, 750 F.2d 927 (Fed. Cir. 1984)).
71 750 F.2d 927, 932 (Fed. Cir. 1984).
72 Id. at 933 (examining whether substantial evidence supports Commission's
determination).
73 915 F.2d 683, 687 (Fed. Cir. 1990) (reviewing decision by Court of International
Trade).
74 Id. at 688 (finding no reversible error in conclusions based on the Atlantic Sugar
standard).
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authority of the Court of International Trade, the expertise it
develops and maintains from its exclusivity is worthy of
respect. In the instances when the decisions of the Court of
International Trade are either not appealed to this court or
are left wholly undisturbed following appeal, those decisions
are likely to "serve as valuable guides to the rights and
obligations of the international trade community."75
Supporting this statement, the Federal Circuit vacated and
remanded the case to the Court of International Trade to afford it
the opportunity to comply with 28 U.S.C. § 2645(a), which
requires the CIT to make findings of fact and conclusions of law
supporting a final decision.76  If the court had truly been
following the apply anew standard there would have been no
reason to vacate because the Federal Circuit would have made its
own determination as to the substantiality of the evidence at the
agency level. However, when the case made its way back to the
Federal Circuit after remand, a new panel applied the Atlantic
Sugar standard of review and affirmed. 77
The sentiment of providing some measure of respect to the
expertise of the CIT is bolstered by the statement of Judge
Bryson of the Federal Circuit in the international trade breakout
session held at the Fifteenth Annual Judicial Conference of the
U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit:
If I have a trade case on the morning's argument. [sic] I will
tell you, I do not feel much like a specialist. I am struggling
to catch up with the arguments that are being made. I,
perhaps in five or ten years, may feel a bit more comfortable
with it. This is terra incognita for me and it is, I think, for
most of my colleagues. So, we venture into these areas not
with the confidence of an area well familiar to us, but this is
alien territory. 78
Since Suramerica, the Federal Circuit appears to be moving
75 Camargo Correa Metais, S.A. v. United States, 52 F.3d 1040, 1042-43 (Fed. Cir.
1995) (quoting National Corn Growers Ass'n v. Baker, 643 F. Supp. 626, 631 (1986)).
76 Id. at 1043 (vacating and remanding the case).
77 See Camargo Correa Metais, S.A. v. United States, 200 F.3d 771, 773 (Fed. Cir.
1999) (defining substantial evidence as "more than a mere scintilla" as applied in Atlantic
Sugar).
78 The Fifteenth Annual Judicial Conference of the United States Court of Appeals for
the Federal Circuit, 180 F.R.D. 467, 604 (Oct. 1998).
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away from the Atlantic Sugar standard of review, with panels
citing the Suramerica rationale on five occasions, including as
recently as March 2002.79 It should be noted that, of the
seventeen judges presently sitting on the Federal Circuit, ten
have served on panels citing Suramerica.80 Of the remaining
seven judges, four are senior judges. Perhaps if the opportunity
were to present itself in the near future, the Federal Circuit
would be inclined to reconsider the Atlantic Sugar rule en banc.
Obviously, the standard of review plays a large role in the
outcome of a particular case. It would also likely reduce the
Federal Circuit's reversal rate of cases on appeal from the CIT.
For the appeals filed with the Federal Circuit during the twelve-
month period ending September 30, 2000, an overwhelming 54
percent were reversed.81 This reversal rate could be lower if
some deference were accorded CIT opinions. The high reversal
rate also adds veracity to Judge Rader's argument that Court of
International Trade judges will be discouraged from making
findings if their opinions are disregarded at the appellate level.82
Furthermore, the reversal rate adds to uncertainty among
members of the bar. The moderator of the international trade
breakout session at the Federal Circuit's Fifteenth Annual
Judicial Conference observed that
many practitioners have perceived that the appellate court's
standard of review basically requires them to ignore what
79 See Novosteel, S.A. v. United States, 284 F.3d 1261, 1269 (Fed. Cir. 2002) (showing
respect for Court of International Trade's opinion); Taiwan Semiconductor Indus. Assoc.
v. Int'l Trade Comm., 266 F.3d 1339, 1344 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (deferring in its review to the
Court of International Trade's decision); Magnesium Corp. of Am. v. United States, 166
F.3d 1364, 1368 (Fed. Cir. 1999) (explaining that findings of the Court of International
Trade will be shown due respect); Angus Chem. Co. v. United States, 140 F.3d 1478, 1483
(Fed. Cir. 1998) (citing Suramerica and explaining the need to respect the Court of
International Trade's decision); Gerald Metals, Inc. v. United States, 132 F.3d 716, 719
(Fed. Cir. 1997) (showing deference to the opinion of the Court of International Trade as
required by Suramerica).
80 Composition of the CAFC obtained from its website at
http://www.fedcir.gov/judgbios.html (last visited January 21, 2003) (listing judges of
federal circuit).
81 See Reports of the Proceedings of the Judicial Conference of the United States,
Table B-8 U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit-Appeals Filed, Terminated, and
Pending During 12-Month Period Ending September 30, 2000, available at
http://www.fedcir.gov/pdf/b08sep00.pdf. (last visited January 21, 2003) (outlining
statistics of federal circuit).
82 See Zenith Elecs. Corp. v. United States, 99 F.3d 1576, 1584 (Rader, J., concurring)
(noting "[tihe trial court, apparently sensing the futility of performing a substantial
evidence review which the appellate court would duplicate, entered only cursory findings
after this complex adjudication.").
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the trial court has done and to revisit the underlying record.
And so, I think that there is a fair amount of confusion in the
private bar as to whether or not the trial court's decision
should be heavily annotated in the briefs.83
Judge Michel, another participant in the international trade
breakout session, commented that:
It is one thing to say that we have this verbiage about how
we stand in the shoes of the Court of International Trade
judge and so we are really reviewing what she decided, de
novo, and looking at what the agency did and so forth. But,
at another level of analysis, it seems to me you have to make
a distinction between mandatory deference and voluntary
deference and between fixed deference and sort of a sliding
scale of deference.
Judge Restani uses a magic word for me when she says,
opinion. 'When I write my opinion .... ' Well, when I get a
case that she has written, the first thing I read is her opinion
- not your brief, not the Government's brief, her opinion.
The standard of review binds me; I cannot depart from it.
But, in terms of the intensity of the study, if the challenger's
brief raises some question focusing on her opinion that gives
me pause, then there is a lot more rigorous review than
otherwise would be the case. So, it would seem to me it is
another opportunity for creative advocacy to focus on what
the trade court judge 'held' and 'found' and said and
articulated as the legal test and so forth. Use that as a place
to try to get a foothold, as opposed to just going straight to
the bottom line of was the evidence sufficient or not.
And it always surprises me how many briefs I read, not only
in trade cases but in almost all areas, where neither side
even mentions the opinion of the trial judge. It is treated as
if it is not important; for advocates it was not there. For us,
it is the baseline of our review - the first thing we read. If
there was an error, show me where in her opinion. Show me
83 See Reports of the Proceedings of the Judicial Conference of the United States,
Table B-8 U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit-Appeals Filed, Terminated, and
Pending During 12-Month Period Ending September 30, 2000, available at
http:l/www.fedcir.gov/pdf/bO8sepOO.pdf. (last visited January 21, 2003) (outlining
statistics of federal circuit).
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what page and what line. 84
The recitation of the "apply anew" standard of review and its
application are clearly not in tandem. The Federal Circuit
clearly values the opinions of the CIT - hopefully there will be
some action taken to express that through an appropriate
standard of review.
ALTERNATIVES TO THE PRESENT REVIEW PROCESS
Several commentators have suggested alternatives to the
current review process, ranging from discretionary appeal to the
Federal Circuit to a change in the standard of review. Each
approach has its benefits and its flaws. The following are the
most constructive solutions suggested.
"Misapprehended or Grossly Misapplied"
As noted earlier, in Suramerica and Zenith, several judges of
the Federal Circuit indicated that they had serious reservations
about the underpinnings of the Atlantic Sugar analysis. 85 They
suggested that if the Court were not bound by precedent, it would
likely follow the Supreme Court's approach in reviewing an
administrative action.8 6 In Universal Camera Corp., v. NLRB
the Supreme Court examined the "effect of the Administrative
Procedure Act and the legislation colloquially known as the Taft-
Hartley Act on the duty of Courts of Appeals when called upon to
review orders of the National Labor Relations Board."8 7 The
Court discussed the substantial evidence standard at length and
concluded that the
[National Labor Relation] Board's findings are entitled to
respect; but they must nonetheless be set aside when the
record before a Court of Appeals clearly precludes the
84 Id. (explaining how the Federal Circuit Court of Appeals judges prefer briefs citing
to trial court opinions).
85 See Suramerica De Aleaciones Laminadas, C.A. v. United States, 44 F.3d 978, 983
(Fed. Cir. 1994) (noting that the statute announcing the standard of review applies to the
Court of International Trade but not to the federal circuit).
86 See id. (explaining that the Court will only review administrative agency review if
substantial evidence standard "appears to have been misapprehended or grossly
misapplied").
87 340 U.S. 474, 476 (1951).
2003]
194 ST JOHN'S JOURNAL OF LEGAL COMMENTARY
Board's decision from being justified by a fair estimate of the
worth of the testimony of witnesses or its informed judgment
on matters within its special competence or both.88
The Court then discussed its role in reviewing a decision by the
Court of Appeals when applying the substantial evidence
standard of review:
Our power to review the correctness of application of the
present standard ought seldom to be called into action.
Whether on the record as a whole there is substantial
evidence to support agency findings is a question which
Congress has placed in the keeping of the Courts of Appeals.
This Court will intervene only in what ought to be the rare
instance when the standard appears to have been
misapprehended or grossly misapplied.89
The Supreme Court has consistently applied the
"misapprehended or grossly misapplied" standard in
administrative review cases. 90
There has been criticism, however, of applying the Supreme
Court's standard of review to administrative appeals being heard
at the Court of Appeals level. In Polcover v. Secretary of the
Treasury the D.C. Circuit stated it would be inappropriate to
follow the "misapprehended or grossly misapplied" standard for
several reasons. 91 First, the legislature specifically intended for
the courts of appeals to bear primary responsibility for review of
NLRB cases. 92  Second, the Supreme Court itself has had
88 Id. at 490.
89 Id. at 490-91 (discussing when it will review standard of review by ITC) (emphasis
added).
90 See, e.g., F.T.C. v. Indiana Fed'n of Dentists, 476 U.S. 447, 453 (1986) ("[wle
granted certiorari... in order to consider the Commission's claim that in vacating the
Commission's order the Court of Appeals misconstrued applicable principles of antitrust
law and misapprehended or grossly misapplied the substantial evidence test."); American
Textile Mfrs. Inst. v. Donovan, 452 U.S. 490, 523 (1981) ("Since the Act places
responsibility for determining substantial evidence questions in the courts of appeals, 29
U.S.C. § 655(f), we apply the familiar rule that this Court will intervene only in what
ought to be the rare instance when the [substantial evidence] standard appears to have
been misapprehended or grossly misapplied." ); see also Beth Israel Hosp. v. NLRB, 437
U.S. 483, 507 (1978); Mobil Oil Corp. v. Federal Power Comm., 417 U.S. 283, 292 (1974)
("We granted the petitions for certiorari ... to determine whether the Court of Appeals
misapprehended or grossly misapplied the substantial evidence standard." (internal
citation omitted)).
91 See Polcover v. Sec'y of the Treasury, 477 F.2d 1223, 1227 (D.C. Cir. 1973) (listing
reasons for not applying the Supreme Court's review standard to the present case).
92 Id (noting that Congress granted the Court of Appeals specifically with the duty to
"grant or deny enforcement of Labor Board orders").
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difficulty applying this standard of review. 93  Third, this
standard would result in either a rubber-stamp of the district
court or degenerate into the test the court was previously using. 94
Ultimately, established circuit precedent precluded the court
from adopting the "misapprehended or grossly misapplied"
standard of review. 95
As Herbert Shelley and his colleagues note in their article,
these concerns are not valid with regard to Federal Circuit
review of trade cases.96 They note that the first step of the
appellate process that occurs at the CIT is critical. At this stage
the administrative record is compiled by the respective agency
being reviewed and is screened by the parties.97 This first step,
they argue, is essential, due to the nature of antidumping and
countervailing duty proceedings which they describe as "informal
'adjudication."' 98 Additionally, the article correctly points out
that the concerns of the D.C. Circuit are not warranted. First,
Congress expressly granted the Court of International Trade
primary responsibility for reviewing agency actions. Unlike
patent cases from the Patent and Trademark Office or
International Trade Commission that are directly appealable to
the Federal Circuit, Congress intended the CIT to determine the
legitimacy of agency actions.99 Second, this standard would
certainly be no more difficult to apply than the current
conglomeration of standards actually applied by the Federal
Circuit.o00 As noted, the Supreme Court's application of this
93 Id. (citing Gastelum-Quinones v. Kennedy, 374 U.S. 469 (1963) as an example of
when the Supreme Court had problems applying test).
94 Polcover, 477 F.2d at 1227 (criticizing application of misapprehended or grossly
misapplied standard because it may lead to identical results with district court or to
application of prior standard).
95 Id. at 1227-28 (listing prior opinions where circuit court criticized application of
"misapprehended or grossly misapplied" standard of review).
96 Shelley, supra note 9, at 1749, 1785-86 (arguing inapplicability of "misapprehended
or grossly misapplied" standard in Federal Circuit review of trade cases because Federal
Circuit has already reviewed lower court's finding).
97 Id. at 1798 (noting preliminary step in appellate process at CIT involves agency
review by respective parties).
98 Id. at 1785 (explaining necessity of first step in appellate process at CIT is based on
nature of proceedings).
99 See 19 U.S.C. § 1516a(e) (2002) (stating "[clonsignee or his agent as party in
interest before the Court of International Trade. The consignee or his agent shall have the
right to appear and to be heard as a party in interest before the United States Court of
International Trade").
100 See generally, Kevin Casey, et al., Standards of Appellate Review in the Federal
Circuit: Substance and Semantics, 11 FED. CIR. B.J. 279 (2001) (discussing various
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standard on numerous occasions would give the Federal Circuit
guidance on its adoption and implementation.'10 Finally, the fear
that such a standard would render the Federal Circuit merely a
rubberstamp to the Court of International Trade can be
controlled by the diligent application of the standard by the
Federal Circuit. This fear alone should not stand in the way of
implementing the standard.102 Furthermore, since the Federal
Circuit has professed its intent to give "due respect" to the
opinions of the CIT, it would be preferable for the Federal Circuit
to utilize a standard that truly grants that respect.l0 3
Discretionary Review by the Federal Circuit
Another alternative to the current review structure for
antidumping and countervailing duty cases is to provide
discretionary review to the Federal Circuit. Under this review
system the Federal Circuit would have the discretionary
authority to review CIT decisions upon appellant's application.
One suggestion is to make all appeals from the CIT
discretionary.104 Another is to make CIT decisions that are
adverse to the Department of Commerce or the ITC appealable as
of right, but make all other CIT decisions wholly discretionary. 05
Of course there are advantages and disadvantages to such a
system. The advantage of such a system is judicial economy.106
The Federal Circuit would theoretically review the most
significant issues while leaving the majority of the work with the
CIT.107 There are at least two major disadvantages of this
standards of review applied by Federal Circuit); Shelley, supra note 9, at 1786 (explaining
CIT's function in appellate process).
101 See Shelley, supra note 9 at 1786.
102 See id. (finding concern for rubber-stamping as result of new standard
unnecessary).
103 See id. at 1786-87 (confirming that the appellate court is able to control
perceptions of rubber-stamping).
104 See id. at 1814 (introducing the idea of discretionary review of CIT decisions by
the Federal Circuit).
105 See id. at 1814 (suggesting as an alternative to discretionary review, review as
matter of right for CIT decisions adverse to Department of Commerce or International
Trade Commission); see also HENRY J. FRIENDLY, Federal Jurisdiction: A General View
176 (Columbia University Press) (1973) (discussing generally discretionary standards of
review applied to administrative decisions).
106 See id. at 1814 (proposing that a two-tier discretionary system will make efficient
use of the Federal Circuit's resources).
107 See id. (clarifying the two-tier advantage of sending significant cases to Federal
Circuit while most other remain in CIT without further review).
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system. First, there is the potential risk of removing a layer of
judicial review. Second, it adds an intermediate step to the
appellate process. 08 This step would require the parties to brief
the issue of whether leave to appeal should be granted, as well as
require a subsequent determination by the Federal Circuit
whether to grant the appeal.109 This would in and of itself raise a
debate over what standard to apply to this process.
Furthermore, it would have the effect of both increasing the cost
and delaying ultimate resolution of the case. 1 10
Shelley's article notes that another consideration weighing
against discretionary review is that recent antidumping and
countervailing duty cases appealed to the Federal Circuit have
generally involved significant legal issues.111 The article also
contends that there is no need to reduce the number of cases on
the Federal Circuit's docket because they account for only a small
portion of the Federal Circuit's docket.112 While the 150 percent
increase in CIT appeals to the Federal Circuit may be an
aberration, it may also prove to be a strong counter-argument to
the claim that there is no need to reduce the number of cases on
the Federal Circuit's docket. Shelley's article correctly notes that
judicial economy would not be greatly enhanced under this
discretionary system and that the appellate court could better
conserve its judicial resources through the application of a more
deferential standard of review. 113 A more deferential standard of
review would reduce the number of appeals because it would not
allow, as Judge Plager noted in Zenith, "disappointed litigants
with deep pockets to seek a second bite at the apple."] 14
CONCLUSION
The simplest and most efficacious approach to resolving the
108 See id. at 1814-15 (identifying one problem inherent in a two-tier review
approach).
109 See id. (explaining disadvantage of the two-tier system in brief and determination
stages of appellate review).
110 See id. at 1815 (noting that discretionary review screening process increases costs
and delays of appeals).
III Id. (pointing out another factor negating power of judicial review).
112 Id. at 1815-16 (positing that the small number of cases in the Federal Circuit
warrant a screening process unnecessary).
113 Id. at 1816 (concluding that discretionary review is not most advantageous option).
114 99 F.3d at 1579 (Plager, J., concurring) (supporting decision not to allow further
review of case).
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problems inherent in the current review structure would be for
the Federal Circuit to adopt the "misapprehended or grossly
misapplied" standard of review announced by the Supreme Court
in Universal Camera v. NLRB. This would accomplish two goals:
(1) promote judicial economy by eliminating the duplicity
currently existing in the two-tiered review system applied to
trade cases; and (2) recognize the expertise of the Court of
International Trade and give proper weight to its decisions in
antidumping and countervailing duty cases.
